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Beyond Fingerprints: Should Europe Consider Using DNA at Its Borders?

Exploring Lessons and Options from Global Practices By Kyle Schroeder is the Regional Director for Europe/CIS at GTH (GTH DNA)

As migration flows continue to test border security worldwide, the use of biometrics for identification has expanded dramatically. Fingerprints and facial recognition systems have become central to migration and border control regimes across many regions. Yet one biometric identifier remains underused in most border environments: DNA.

DNA offers a highly reliable means of identification, particularly valuable in verifying claimed family relationships, uncovering human trafficking networks, contributing to the resolution of identity fraud cases, and even screening for criminals. In some countries, DNA collection for immigration-related enforcement has been implemented for years, offering potential insights into how this tool can be integrated effectively and responsibly. For Europe, ongoing reforms in migration and asylum policy present a timely opportunity to evaluate whether DNA could play a broader and more complementary role in border security, anti-trafficking efforts, asylum verification, and humanitarian identification efforts.

A Case Study in Operational Deployment: DNA Use in Immigration Contexts
In the United States, legislation enabling traditional DNA collection from immigration detainees was passed in 2005. Implementation advanced gradually, and since 2019, the effort has scaled significantly. According to a 2023 report from the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), nearly one million DNA samples were collected by immigration enforcement agencies between fiscal years 2020 and 2022.

These samples were collected as part of intake procedures at detention facilities and submitted to the FBI for analysis and subsequent searching against the unsolved crimes or missing persons index in CODIS, the U.S. national DNA database. While the volume of samples is notable, the GAO also reported that only about 37% of individuals encountered by Customs and Border Protection (CBP) had their DNA collected during the fiscal year 2022. The shortfall was partially attributed to the fact that some individuals encountered may not have been subject to the CBP collection mandate. But some of the shortfall was also attributed to operational challenges, including staffing limitations, lack of collection kits, logistical barriers, and varying levels of agency implementation.

Lack of full implementation allows some offenders to fall through the cracks. One publicly reported example was the 2023 case involving the murder of Rachel Morin in Maryland. The suspect, a Salvadoran national with multiple prior illegal entries, did not have his DNA collected during previous detentions and deportations by DHS. Had DNA collection occurred during these detentions as required by law, authorities likely would have identified him for a separate assault he committed earlier that year before Rachel’s murder, thereby possibly preventing her death.

While this particular policy framework is specific to one national context, it offers useful operational lessons. Collection workflows must be standardized and adequately resourced. Moreover, mechanisms must be in place to ensure that DNA profiles are managed in accordance with the rights of migrants, especially those who are later granted asylum or other lawful statuses.

Countries considering similar models must also ensure public transparency. Public confidence in biometric systems—particularly those that involve sensitive genetic data—depends on clear guidelines around access, retention, and deletion. Without such safeguards, even well-intentioned programs risk losing legitimacy or triggering legal challenges.

Applications of Rapid DNA Technology
Beyond traditional DNA processing, the emergence of Rapid DNA technology has added a new dimension to border operations. Rapid DNA instruments, which can process buccal swab samples and generate profiles in ninety minutes, are being used in certain migration and enforcement settings to verify claimed family relationships.

Where adults and children present themselves as familial units but doubts arise regarding the validity of the relationship, Rapid DNA testing can be used to assess biological relatedness. Public reporting from the U.S.’s pilot efforts in 2019 indicated that, in some locations, up to 13% of claimed parent-child relationships tested were not biologically accurate. Moreover, after the program was implemented, the CBP saw a dramatic decrease in the number of fraudulent families being detected, highlighting the program’s deterrence value.

This technology enables timely determinations, which is especially relevant in high-volume or high-risk environments. Without Rapid DNA, traditional lab-based testing may take weeks or months. During that time, individuals are often released into communities while awaiting outcomes. Rapid DNA reduces this window, potentially mitigating fraud and improving child protection.

In Europe, some countries already conduct familial relationship verification using standard DNA methods in asylum and migration contexts. However, logistical delays in sample transport and laboratory processing can significantly slow down the response. In some jurisdictions, results may take weeks or even months—well beyond the period during which detained migrants are typically held. Introducing Rapid DNA in targeted scenarios—such as at migration hotspots or for cases flagged for possible trafficking—could enhance both speed and accuracy. It could also mean that fraudulent family units are not released into the EU while awaiting traditional DNA results to arrive.

Moreover, the application of this technology could prove particularly useful in protecting vulnerable populations. Minors arriving at the border unaccompanied or accompanied by unrelated adults are at heightened risk for exploitation. Rapidly verifying claimed family relationships could serve as a protective mechanism—one that aligns with broader child welfare objectives. As with all tools, its implementation must be carefully circumscribed and accompanied by appropriate ethical oversight.

Legal and Ethical Considerations in a European Context
In the European Union, any use of DNA for migration enforcement would need to comply with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) (and perhaps even the Law Enforcement Directive – EU Directive 2016/680), which sets stringent requirements for the collection, processing, storage, and deletion of biometric data. Any proposed framework should be:

  • Purpose-limited: Restricted to specific, clearly defined objectives such as fraud prevention, protection of minors, or screening for criminals.
  • Time-bound: With mechanisms for automatic expungement after a defined period or upon change in immigration status.
  • Oversight-enabled: Subject to monitoring by independent data protection authorities.
    The EU already maintains a continent-wide DNA data-sharing infrastructure under the Prüm Convention, primarily used for criminal investigations. Extending the use of DNA to migration contexts would represent a policy shift and would require careful calibration to respect individual rights while supporting broader public interest goals.

Any expansion of DNA use in border contexts would also need to navigate national laws. In some EU member states, domestic legislation restricts the collection of DNA to cases involving suspected criminal offenses. A multi-layered governance framework would be necessary to ensure that DNA collection is lawful, proportionate, and subject to both national and EU-level oversight.

The European Court of Human Rights has previously ruled on the importance of proportionality in biometric data retention (see S and Marper v. United Kingdom [2008] ECHR 1581 and Aycaguer. France [2017] ECHR (8806/12), ruling that indefinite retention of DNA samples or profiles (taken during arrest) after acquittal or charges being dropped violates the European Convention on Human Rights. In other words, DNA sample and profile retention periods must be defined and proportionate to the underlying crime. Within the context of DNA at borders, one possible policy to address the implications of S and Marper v. United Kingdom and Aycaguer v. France is either not retaining the DNA profile (in the case of Rapid DNA) or only retaining DNA profiles until a migrant is granted asylum or legal status (traditional DNA).

Current Trends in EU Border Biometrics
The EU recently expanded its border biometrics under the Pact on Migration and Asylum (2024), improving technology platforms like Eurodac, which is central to the processing of asylum seekers and irregular migrants. Reforms to Eurodac under the Pact include expanding the range of individuals subject to biometric collection, collecting additional biometric data (such as facial images), and improving data-sharing mechanisms across member states within the Eurodac system.

However, Eurodac still only includes fingerprints and facial images, which are effective for identity verification of an individual but do not establish biological relationships. This leaves a gap, an inability to quickly confirm familial links or detect attempts to misrepresent identities in kinship-based asylum claims. Integrating DNA—especially Rapid DNA—into this toolkit could help close a critical gap in the processing of asylum claims involving minors, cases of suspected trafficking, or fraudulent documentation. It could also assist in identifying deceased individuals and facilitating family reunifications in cross-border contexts.

Operational Blueprint: How DNA Could Be Applied at Borders

Should EU policymakers choose to explore this capability further, several technical and operational components could be considered:

  1. Pilot Programs: Targeted use of DNA testing at specific high-risk entry points such as Lampedusa, Lesbos, or Ceuta/Melilla. These pilots could focus on verifying family units or screening in trafficking investigations.
  2. Limited Scope Deployments: DNA testing could be reserved for secondary screening processes where red flags arise—rather than as a blanket requirement.
  3. Data Retention Policies: Adoption of auto-expungement policies after results are generated, a certain period, or after legal status is granted to ensure proportionality and minimize long-term privacy risks.
  4. Interoperability with Prüm: Consideration of how migrant or asylum DNA profiles meeting certain requirements might qualify for sharing within the Prüm network, whether for criminal or non-criminal reasons, or even through INTERPOL’s non-criminal sharing network called I-Familia.
  5. Training and Resources: Border agencies would require some training and logistical support to integrate DNA collection—particularly Rapid DNA—into their workflows without disrupting primary processing responsibilities.

The EU could even pool resources to establish several mobile Rapid DNA response teams (Rapid DNA instruments and workflow installed inside of a van) for deployment to hotspots across the continent. This would provide European countries with Rapid DNA capabilities while sharing costs with other nations that may not need their own equipment but value occasional use when conditions require.

The implementation of these measures would require multi-stakeholder engagement, including border agencies, data protection authorities, civil society organizations, and technical experts. Collaboration would help ensure the development of balanced protocols that align operational effectiveness with human rights principles.

A Technical Tool with Targeted Benefits
DNA is not a standalone solution for migration management, but its unique ability to verify biological relationships and identify criminal offenders makes it valuable in specific contexts. It can help distinguish legitimate families from those formed under coercion or fraud—supporting both security and humanitarian goals.

As Europe adapts to changing migration dynamics, DNA offers a tool for faster, more accurate decisions in complex cases involving exploitation or identity uncertainty. It could also help screen for criminals entering the continent. With proper safeguards, it could enhance the EU’s biometric systems while balancing enforcement needs with human rights protections.